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The Texas Family Code is integrated and complex and was enacted by
comprehensive statutes. Title 2, Parent and Child, was enacted as a unit in
1973.' The overall plan of the Code appears to meet the general needs of
parents and children, but in several cases provisions of the Code and the
relationships between various subsections have been found to be unconsti-
tutional, unclear, or unfair. The legislature has, in each session since 1973,
modified portions of the Code that seemed most in need of improvement.
The recent session was no exception. There were a number of minor
changes, but two areas were deemed especially important: continuing ju-
risdiction and procedures for protecting a child in an emergency. The first
change was in response to questions concerning continuing exclusive juris-
diction raised by various family law attorneys and resulted in three sepa-
rate acts; 2 the second change was in response to a federal court's finding.'
The primary purpose of the various amendments to section 11.05, Con-
tinuing Jurisdiction 4 is to carve out some exceptions to the inflexible rule
of continuing jurisdiction in suits affecting the parent-child relationship.
Unfortunately, the amendments were not introduced as a package, but in-
stead were written and passed separately without any attempt at reconcili-
ation of numbering or wording. Nevertheless, the amendments do not
appear to conflict, so that all the amendments should be capable of being
harmonized. Two separate subsection (e)'s were enacted, one providing
that no court has continuing exclusive jurisdiction over a child until it has
entered a final order6 and the other providing for the destruction of a
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate Professor of
Law, Southern Methodist University.
i. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 543, § 1, at 1411.
2. S.B. 143, S.B. 768, and H.B. 1493, 66th Tex. Legis. Sess. (1979).
3. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'dand
dismissed sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979).
4. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
5. See the Code Construction Act, which provides that "if amendments to the same
statute are enacted at the same session of the legislature, one amendment without reference
to another, the amendments shall be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to
each." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5429b-2, § 3.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
6. (e) A court does not acquire continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the mat-
ters provided for under this subtitle in connection with the child before the
entry of a final decree. A voluntary or involuntary dismissal of a suit affecting
the parent-child relationship or the entry of a decree by another court having
dominant jurisdiction of the suit terminates all jurisdiction of the court. Un-
less a final decree has been entered by a court of continuing, exclusive j urisdic-
tion, a subsequent suit shall be commenced as an original proceeding.
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court's continuing jurisdiction upon the remarriage of the parents of a
child.7 Since these two sections involve entirely different subject matter, it
is obvious that there is no conflict, and the only difficulty that can arise
from the duplication of the same subsection letter should be in citation.
There is a similar problem in connection with subsection (a), because there
are now two of these subdivisions as well. One subsection cross-references
to portions of sections 11.05, 11.052 and 11.06,8 while the other includes
some of those references but adds cross-references to sections 17.05 and
17.06. This confusion can be eliminated by the drafting of a master ver-
sion of section 11.05(a) that incorporates all the cross-references into one
section.'o
The problem of continuing exclusive jurisdiction when the child and the
managing conservator have left Texas and have lived in another state for
more than six months is addressed in newly created subsection 11.052,
which provides that unless there is a written agreement by the parties to
continue to be supervised by the original court, that court loses the power
to modify its original decree." In emergencies it may be necessary for a
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
7. (e) A court acquires jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relation-
ship without a transfer under Section 11.06 of this code, even though another
court has continuing jurisdiction over the child, if the parents of the child have
remarried after the dissolution of a previous marriage between the parents and
file in the court acquiring jurisdiction a suit for the dissolution of their subse-
quent marriage combined with a suit affecting the parent-child relationship
concerning the child.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
8. "(a) Except as provided in Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section and in
Section 11.052 of this code, when a court acquires jurisdiction ... [n]o other court ... hasjurisdiction . . . except on transfer as provided in Section 11.06 of this code." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 11.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
9. "(a) Except as provided in Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section and Sec-
tion 17.05 of this code, when a court acquires jurisdiction . . . no other court has jurisdiction
. . . except on transfer as provided in Section 11.06 or 17.06 of this code." TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 11.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
10. Sec. 11.05. CONTINUING JURISDICTION. (a) Except as provided in
Subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) . . . of this section and in Section 11.052...
and Section 17.05 of this Code, when a court acquires continuing jurisdiction
of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, that court retains continuing
jurisdiction of all parties and. . . matters provided for under this subtitle in
connection with the child. No other court of this state. . . has jurisdiction of
a suit affecting the parent-child relationship with regard to that child except on
transfer as provided in section 11.06 or 17.06 . . . of this code.
This version of § 11.05(a) was written by Professor Eugene Smith of the University of Hous-
ton Law School and reproduced in 79-3 STATE B. SEC. REP. FAM. L. 25 (1979).
I1. (a) Except on the written agreement of all the parties, a court may not exer-
cise its continuing jurisdiction to modify:
(1) the appointment of a managing conservator if the managing conserva-
tor and the child have established and continued to maintain their principal
residence in another state for more than six months unless the action was
filed and pending before the six-month period; or
(2) any part of a decree if all of the parties and the child have established
and continue to maintain their principal residence outside this state.
(b) This section does not affect the power of the court to enforce and enter a
judgment on its decree.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.052 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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court in the county where the child is present to issue temporary orders for
the protection of the child. Section 17.05 2 was added to the Code for this
purpose, and section 17.06' 3 provides for the return of jurisdiction to the
original court of exclusive jurisdiction after the crisis has passed. All of
these exceptions are cross-referenced into section 11.05 as explained above.
Sims v. State Department of Public Wefare14 was clearly in the minds of
the legislators when they totally revised chapter 17, changing its name to
"Emergency Procedures in Suit by Governmental Entity" from "Suit for
Protection of Child in Emergency." The change responds to the criticisms
of the Sims court and should, if followed in practice, prevent a repetition
of the events that gave rise to that litigation. 5 The revised statute provides
that unless certain specified conditions are met, a child should not be taken
into custody without a court order. 6 The court order must be based on a
sworn petition or affidavit and may not extend more than ten days.' 7 The
requirement of at least an ex parte hearing on the first working day that a
court is available solves the problem of children lingering in the custody of
the state for long periods of time without any hearing. If no court is avail-
12. (a) A suit affecting the parent-child relationship brought by a governmental
entity seeking conservatorship or termination and a temporary restraining or-
der or attachment of a child under this chapter may be filed in any court with
jurisdiction to hear suits affecting the parent-child relationship in the county
in which the child is found.
(b) Immediately after the issuance of such temporary orders as are necessary
for the protection of the child pending a final hearing, a governmental entity
shall determine the court of continuing jurisdiction and shall institute any
transfers as are necessary under Section 17.06 or 11.06 of this code.
Id. § 17.05.
13. (a) Immediately after entry of temporary orders necessary for the protection
of the child pending a final hearing, the court on the motion of a party shall
transfer to the court of continuing jurisdiction, if there is a court of continuing
jurisdiction, or if there is no court of continuing jurisdiction, to the court hav-
ing venue of the suit affecting the parent-child relationship under Section
11.04 of this code. Transfers shall be made under the procedures provided by
Section 11.06 of this code.
(b) Temporary orders issued under this chapter are valid and enforceable
until properly superseded by a court with jurisdiction to do so.
(c) Any court to which the suit has been transferred may enforce by con-
tempt or otherwise any temporary order properly issued under this chapter.
Id. § 17.06.
14. 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd and dismissedsub nom. Moore v. Sims, 99
S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979). The decision to reverse was 5-4 and was based on a
finding that the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), did apply, and
that it was therefore unnecessary to reach the merits. See also Solender, Family Law.- Parent
and Child, Annual Surpey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 155, 181 (1979).
15. In that case the children were held in custody without a hearing on the merits for 42
days. 438 F. Supp. at 1184. One concern of the Sims court, the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard, 438 F. Supp. at 1194, was not addressed by the legislature, and the standard
remains unchanged. "The court's findings shall be based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence under rules generally applicable to civil cases." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15
(Vernon 1975). The recent holding in Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323
(1979), that the standard of proof for involuntary commitment to state mental hospitals must
be clear and convincing, might be extended to require such a standard for proceedings in
which the state is attempting to take custody from parents.
16. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 17.03 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
17. Id. § 17.02.
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able after three working days, the child is to be returned to whoever is
entitled to possession. 8 In any event, a full adversary hearing is required
no later than ten days from the time the child has been taken into posses-
sion by an agency of the state. 9 In addition to all the revisions of chapter
17, chapter 11 was amended to provide for the appointment of an attorney
ad litem for the child as soon as practicable whenever the state is seeking
to terminate the parent-child relationship or to obtain custody of the
child.2" There is a provision for payment of this attorney by the parents
when the parents are not indigent, but no payment is mandated when the
parents are indigent.2 '
This concern for children "lost" in the system is evidenced by the addi-
tion this session of a new chapter to the Code.22 This chapter, entitled
Review of Placement of Children Under the Care of the Department of
Human Resources, is intended to provide a check on the department. It
applies to children committed to its care either voluntarily2 3 or involunta-
rily.24 The chapter provides, in essence, that hearings concerning the
placement of the child must be held approximately every six months until
there is some permanent disposition of the child.25 If either the court or
the particular division of the department involved is conscientious, there
should be no problem with keeping track of the children under the depart-
ment's jurisdiction. This section should be helpful in focusing on the need
to place children permanently as soon as possible. In areas in which court
supervision is lax and the department is understaffed, however, the chil-
dren in custody will remain as "lost" as ever because there is no outside
triggering mechanism for the periodic review.
The legislature made revisions or additions in three other areas of the
Code that indicate that Texans are in tune with current trends in family
law. A major addition was title 4, entitled Protection of the Family, which
concerns the problem of violence in the family.26 Secondly, provision was
made for the child born alive as the result of an abortion to be placed in
the custody of the Department of Human Resources and for parental
rights to be terminated when appropriate.27 Thirdly, the legislature in a
18. Id. § 17.03(c).
19. Id. § 17.04.
20. Id. § 11.1O(d).
21. Id. § 11.10(e).
22. Id. §§ 18.01-.06.
23. d. § 18.02.
24. Id. § 18.01.
25. Id. §§ 18.01, .06.
26. Id. §§ 71.01-.19. Although this chapter has been in effect since Sept. I, 1979, it has
not been tested by the courts, nor is there a record of its implementation. There may be
problems relating to due process if the protective orders are viewed as self-executing, be-
cause a hearing as to the fact of a violation of a protective order occurring outside the pres-
ence of the court would seem to be a minimal constitutional requirement. Section 71.16
provides for a warning that violation of an ex parte order may be punished as contempt of
court by a fine and jail term and that a violation after a hearing is a criminal offense.
27. Id. §§ 12.05, 15.022, 17.011.
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half-hearted way recognized the concept of joint custody.28 This recogni-
tion applies only to agreed arrangements,2 9 but since joint custody is not
prohibited as to court appointed conservators, 30 it may be that in the
proper case, a court will order a joint managing conservatorship for a
Texas child.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During the past year the United States Supreme Court has continued to
try to resolve the question of the relative equality of the illegitimate child,
the child's mother, and the child's father with respect to each other and to
the rest of society. It appears to be constitutional to abolish the concept of
illegitimacy altogether, but the problem of proof as to fatherhood would
remain. More important, social policy still favors the regularization of re-
lationships. The Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. Hughes3 is based
on both the problem of proof and the "condemnation of irresponsible
liasons beyond the bonds of marriage."32 The decision upheld the Georgia
wrongful death statute that allows the mother of an illegitimate child to
sue for the child's negligent death, but bars the father's action unless he
has taken appropriate steps to legitimate the child.33 The Court said that
when the sexes are not similarly situated, a statutory classification based
on this dissimilarity may be valid. Stressing the importance of maintain-
ing an orderly and fair system of property distribution after death, the
Court distinguished this decision from Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. ," on the basis that Parham could have changed his status as a father,
whereas in Weber, the child could not legitimate himself.
Texas, which has recently reformed its Probate Code,35 has a wrongful
death statute36 that would, at a minimum, conform to the requirements of
the Georgia statute and should not be affected by this decision. In fact, the
recent changes in the Probate Code appear to more than meet the mandate
28. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT (1978); Child Custody. A
Symposium, 53 CONN. B.J. 269 (1979).
29. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
30. Id. § 14.01 (Vernon 1975).
31. 99 S. Ct. 1742, 60 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1979). Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the
Court, Justice Powell concurred, and Justice White wrote for the four dissenters.
32. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
33. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1307 (1968).
34. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See also Califano v. Boles, 99 S. Ct. 2767, 61 L. Ed. 2d 541
(1979), rev'g 464 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Tex. 1978), which held that the denial of a mother's
insurance benefits to the mother of an illegitimate child who never was married to the de-
ceased wage earner while granting the benefits to the widow or divorced wife of the wage
earner was not a denial of equal protection. The Court held that the classifications bore a
rational relationship to the purposes of the Social Security Act and did not discriminate
against illegitimate children. The Court pointed out that illegitimate children can receive
children's insurance benefits even though their unmarried mothers cannot receive the
mother's insurance benefits. The discrimination is therefore not focused on the child's
needs.
35. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
36. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1952).
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of Lalli v. La//i,37 in which the Supreme Court held constitutional a New
York statute that limited proof of paternity for inheritance purposes to
court adjudication during the father's lifetime. The new provisions in the
Texas Probate Code include as bases for determining heirship, both court
adjudicated legitimation and voluntary legitimation executed in accord-
ance with the Family Code.38
The Texas Family Code provisions concerning court recognition of a
father's petition to legitimate his child39 may be found unconstitutional as
a denial of equal protection based on the reasoning of Caban v. Moham-
med.no In that case the Court held unconstitutional a New York statute
that permitted the natural mother to block the natural father's adoption of
his illegitimate child. The Texas Supreme Court struggled with this prob-
lem in 1976 in In re K 4 The facts of Caban could hardly be more differ-
ent from those of In re K. In Caban the mother and father of the two
children had lived together for approximately five years, and both parents
contributed to the support of the family. The mother broke up the home
by taking the children with her in order to live with another man, whom
she subsequently married. The father's interest in his children continued,
and, when he had the opportunity, he obtained their custody through self-
help. This action triggered the legal proceedings that resulted in a court's
granting the mother and her husband the right to adopt the children. The
Texas case, on the other hand, concerned the classic circumstance of an
illegitimate infant whose parents had evidenced no concern for each other
and whose father, prior to his notification of an impending hearing on ter-
mination of parental rights, had indicated no interest in his child. The
father in this particular case was in the penitentiary, so he could not have
37. 439 U.S. 259 (1978); see Note, Equal Protection and the Inheritance Rights ofthe
Illegitimate Child- La//i v. Lali, 33 Sw. L.J. 883 (1979). See also Solender, supra note 14, at
156-57.
38. Inheritance Rights of Legitimated Children
(a) Maternal Inheritance. For the purpose of inheritance, a child is the legit-
imate child of his mother, so that he and his issue shall inherit from his mother
and from his maternal kindred, both descendants, ascendants, and collaterals
in all degrees, and they may inherit from him and his issue.
(b) Paternal Inheritance. For the purpose of inheritance, a child is the legiti-
mate child of his father if the child is born or conceived before or during the
marriage of his father and mother or is legitimated by a court decree as pro-
vided by Chapter 13 of the Family Code, or if the father executed a statement
of paternity as provided by Section 13.22 of the Family Code, or a like state-
ment properly executed in another jurisdiction, so that he and his issue shall
inherit from his father and from his paternal kindred, both descendents, as-
cendants, and collaterals in all degrees, and they may inherit from him and his
issue.
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (footnote omitted). The Family Code
provisions referred to in the new Probate Code section are §§ 13.21-.24.
39. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See specifically § 13.21(b)(3),
allowing the court to designate the father as a parent if "the mother or the managing conser-
vator, if any, has consented to the decree."
40. 99 S. Ct. 1760, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979).
41. 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976). A recent case, In re T.E.T., 583 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1979, writ filed), involving a 14-year-old mother and an 18-year-old father,
followed the reasoning of In re K and denied the father's petition for legitimation.
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maintained physical custody even if he had been permitted to legitimate
the child. The Texas case is especially interesting because it is the type of
fact situation that the dissent in Caban envisioned and that caused Justice
Stevens to express his concern that the holding should be viewed nar-
rowly.4 2
The majority opinion in Caban is based on the concept that gender-
based distinctions must serve governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to those objectives unless there is a universal difference
between the sexes that compels the distinction. The majority rejected the
proposition that unwed fathers are invariably less qualified as parents than
are unwed mothers and so found that there was a denial of equal protec-
tion. The Court indicated, however, that there may be some different
problems relating to the adoption of newborns, and refrained from finding
that statutes specifically designed to expedite the placement and adoption
of newborns would constitute a denial of equal protection even if the stat-
utes appear to distinguish between fathers and mothers.43
The Texas statutory scheme is based on a two-step procedure. The
rights of the natural parent are terminated, and then the child may be con-
sidered for adoption.44 Parents may voluntarily relinquish their child,45 or
their relationship may be involuntarily terminated for cause.46 While a
mother is always a parent, an unwed father is not a parent unless he has
been adjudicated a parent,47 and it is at this point that either the court's or
the mother's consent is required.48 If the mother or the court refuses to
permit a father to legitimate his child and thus to become a parent, there
would be no need to find grounds for termination of the parent-child rela-
tionship. Under the statute, a father-child relationship is of no legal conse-
quence other than the constitutional support obligation 49 and, therefore,
the nonparent father would have no special interest in his child.
It would be possible to amend the present Texas statute to be gender-
neutral in relation to legitimation, by omitting from section 13.21, Volun-
tary Legitimation, the need for consent of the mother or of anyone else and
by establishing the legitimation proceeding as one concerned with proof of
paternity rather than fitness. Then, section 15.02 on termination of paren-
tal rights should be carefully examined to be sure it includes as grounds for
termination everything necessary to protect the child from an unfit parent.
In two cases the United States Supreme Court attempted to minimize
state intervention while recognizing a possible conflict of interests between
parent and child. In Parham v. JR. ," a case involving the mental health
laws of Georgia that permit the parents or legal guardians of minors vol-
42. 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1780-81, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297, 321-22 (1979).
43. Id. at 1768 n.l, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 307 n.l1.
44. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1980).
45. Id. § 15.01 (Vernon 1975).
46. Id. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
47. Id. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975).
48. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
49. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
50. 99 S. Ct. 2493, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1979).
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untarily to commit the minors to state mental hospitals, the Court bal-
anced the parents' right to do what they believe is in the best interest of
their child against the possibility of an error that would seriously interfere
with a child's liberty interest. The Court found that there must be some
neutral check on parents' rights to commit a child to a mental hospital and
held that an admitting physician is capable of protecting the child from an
unnecessary commitment." The Court did not believe that requiring a
court hearing would significantly reduce possible mistakes. The Court also
assumed that when the state has custody of a child, the state acts in good
faith and there is no greater need for judicial intervention than when a
parent is asking for commitment. 2
The Court in Bellotti v. Baird53 found unconstitutional the Massachu-
setts statute regulating the abortions of minors. The Court tried to give
some guidance as to what type of statute would be constitutional, but since
the Court's policy is to refrain from interfering directly between parent
and child, the opinion does not reflect a clear direction. The Court is con-
cerned that the mature minor should not be prevented from making her
own decisions, and while the Court does not provide a definition of mature
minor, it is clear that age is not the sole factor.5 ' The Court held that a
minor found to be mature has a right to an abortion without notification of
her parents. 5 The Court's position regarding ordinary minors is less clear,
except that parents must be prevented from having an absolute veto. Since
Texas does not yet have a statute with this type of requirement, the legisla-
ture may wait until there is further clarification before amending the sec-
tion of the Family Code pertaining to medical consent. 6 There are no
criminal penalties for violating this section; the remedy must be a civil suit.
III. STATUS
The question of the free admission of illegal alien children to Texas
public schools still has not been resolved. There are, as yet, few reported
cases, and the two that have been reported are in opposition to each other.
The most recent, Doe v. Plyler,5 17 decided by federal district Judge William
Wayne Justice, held that it was an unconstitutional denial of equal protec-
tion to require that undocumented children pay $1,000 in tuition in order
to attend school in the Tyler Independent School District. The court did
not believe that the alleged legislative intent of saving money was served
by denying free education to undocumented children, because in the long
run a large segment of under-educated people will result in higher welfare
51. Id. at 2506-07, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 121-22.
52. Id. at 2512, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 128.
53. 99 S. Ct. 3035, 61 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1979).
54. Id. at 3043-52, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 807-18.
55. Id. at 3051, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 816.
56. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 35.03 (Vernon 1975); see particularly subsection (a)(4),
which permits an unmarried pregnant minor to consent to any medical treatment related to
her pregnancy except abortion.
57. 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
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costs and, therefore, greater expense to the state. In equal protection cases
the treatment of aliens does not require the test of "strict scrutiny" in all
situations;58 there need be only a rational relationship between the treat-
ment of the aliens and the legislation in question. The POler court did not
find a rational relationship and held that undocumented children should
not be subjected to different treatment from lawful aliens.59
The concern of the courts for the education and well-being of minors is
further demonstrated by the case of Doe v. Marshall,6" in which a federal
court had to intervene to enable an emotionally troubled student to be
eligible to play football over the objection of the state high school athletic
regulatory body. The student brought an action under the federal statute
relating to rights of the handicapped.6 The court, in granting the injunc-
tion, noted that these were very particular circumstances and that it was
necessary for the mental health of the student that he play on the team in
question.62 Football is not usually perceived as being a necessary activity,
as was demonstrated by the case of Lincoln v. Mid- Cities Pee Wee Football
Association.63 That case involved an eight-year-old girl who wanted to
play tackle football in the Mid-Cities Pee Wee league. The association
decided to limit participation in the existing league to boys and to form a
new league for girls. When only eight girls signed up to play, the new
league was dropped. Plaintiff, relying on the Texas Constitution,' wanted
both a temporary and a permanent injunction preventing the association
from excluding her or, alternatively, enjoining the association from the
free use of the public school facilities. The trial court, relying on prece-
dent,65 denied the temporary injunction, and the appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court construed the Texas equal rights amendment66 as not
covering purely private conduct. Sufficient state involvement is required
so as to make it unreasonable to conclude that the activity is purely pri-
vate. This means that private conduct could be regulated if it is shown that
it was "encouraged by, enabled by, or closely interrelated in function with
state action.""
The difficulties of being a parent of a retarded child were poignantly
illustrated by the case of Little v. Little.68 In Little a normal brother who
58. See e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 99 S. Ct. 1589, 60 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1979); Foley v. Con-
nelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
59. 458 F. Supp. at 586-93. But see Hernandez v. Houston Independent School Dist.,
558 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Solender, supra note
14, at 159.
60. 459 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
62. 459 F. Supp. at 1192.
63. 576 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
64. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a (Texas equal rights amendment).
65. See Junior Football Ass'n v. Gaudet, 546 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976, no writ).
66. TEX. Co NsT. art. I, § 3a, which provides: "Equality under the law shall not be de-
nied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin." (Emphasis added.)
67. 576 S.W.2d at 926.
68. 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
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was suffering from endstage renal disease needed a kidney transplant from
the incompetent child. Such a transplant is not usually beneficial to the
donor, although it is not necessarily harmful. The court found no statutory
basis for authorizing the guardian to consent to such a transplant.69 Texas
does not recognize the substituted judgment doctrine, which would allow a
guardian to make the decision on the assumption that the incompetent
would have made the same decision as the guardian had the incompetent
been normal. The court decided in this case that the transplant would be
psychologically beneficial to the incompetent because she would have in-
creased self-esteem and enhanced status that would probably lead to
greater personal happiness as well as not losing a beloved brother.7" In
another case,7 involving an injury to a mentally retarded child, the court
found against the parents, relying on the Texas Education Code,7 2 which
provides that teachers are not personally liable for events that occur within
the scope of their duties while exercising their discretion, unless the teacher
used excessive force.
The Texas courts do recognize, however, that parents are concerned for
their children and are permitting recovery for the parents' mental anguish
resulting from injury to their children. In Covington v. Estate of Foster73
the court reversed and remanded a personal injury case because the trial
court excluded all evidence of the suffering of the parents as a result of
their minor child's injuries. The child was in the car with her parents at
the time of the accident. While all three were injured, the extensive inju-
ries to the child caused the greater suffering of the parents. The court held
that it is not unforeseeable as a matter of law: that driving the wrong way
on a divided highway would cause a head-on collision with another vehi-
cle; that injury to the occupants, including minor children, may occur; and
that the children's parents would suffer mental anguish as a result.74
Not only is a parent's mental anguish questioned in a personal injury
case, but that parent's character may sometimes be put in issue. In Roth v.
Law7" appellants had attempted to show that a child's eye injury might
have been caused by child abuse instead of the automobile accident that
was the subject of the suit. Their contention was based on a prior custody
suit. The appellate court sustained the trial court in finding that rightful
custody was irrelevant to the personal injury suit. The fact that such mat-
ters were sought to be introduced in a trial totally unrelated to child abuse
illustrates the importance of establishing a mechanism for keeping the
records of the Texas Department of Human Resources accurate and pri-
vate.76 This problem was further highlighted in S.P. v. Dallas County Child
69. Id. at 496.
70. Id. at 499.
71. Schumate v. Thompson, 580 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979,
writ refd n.r.e.).
72. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.912 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
73. 584 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 729.
75. 579 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
76. See discussion of this issue in Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp.
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Welfare Unit,7 7 in which plaintiff sought to have all records and files con-
cerning a criminal arrest for child abuse expunged. The court, relying on
provisions of the Criminal Code,78 agreed that all records relating to the
criminal arrest could be expunged, including those in the files of the De-
partment of Human Resources, but that any nonaccusatory reports made
in accordance with the child abuse provisions of the Family Code7 9 were
not subject to expunction."
Insurance companies lost in two cases based on interpretations of insur-
ance policies relating to minors. In the first8' the court found that a four-
teen-year-old was a resident of his mother's household as defined by the
policy. The minor's custody had been given to the mother by a court in
connection with her divorce in 1964, but by informal agreement the minor
lived with his father. The father had a larger house than the mother, and
the father's address was used for school purposes; however, the minor kept
extra clothes at the mother's apartment and spent time there. The court
found that a child can have more than one residence, particularly a child
of divorced parents, and therefore this minor came within the scope of the
insurance policy. In the other case the insured attempted to collect from
his major medical insurer for benefits based on his daughter's hospitaliza-
tion.82 The daughter had married during the time covered by the premium
and had been hospitalized after her marriage, but during the premium pe-
riod. The policy defined a dependent child as being unmarried, and the
insurance company contended that on the day the daughter married its
liability terminated. The Texas Supreme Court held otherwise, basing its
holding on the Insurance Code, which provides that a limitation will not
take effect during the period for which a premium is accepted.83
In Sprague v. Memorial Baptist Hospital System8 4 the minor was pre-
cluded from recovery based on the old doctrine of charitable immunity.
The minor suffered her injury at the time of her birth, prior to March 9,
1966. The Texas Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of charitable
immunity was abrogated as to all causes of action arising from events after
that date, 85 so the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the hos-
pital was affirmed. In another case a special statute of limitations pre-
vented a minor from recovering.86 The minor was injured by an allegedly
1179, 1191-92 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd and dismissed sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371,
60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979).
77. 577 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
78. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1980).
79. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.05 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
80. 577 S.W.2d at 388.
81. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Phillips. 575 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978,
no writ).
82. Bomar v. Trinity Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1979).
83. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.70--7 (Vernon 1963).
84. 580 S.W.2d I (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
85. Howle v. Camp Amon Carter, 470 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1971) (interpreting Watkins v.
Southcrest Baptist Church, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966)).
86. Mahathy v. George L. Ingram & Assoc., 584 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1979, no writ).
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negligently designed door on a school building, but the court found that
the ten-year statute of limitations relating to architects87 had expired prior
to the injury. It was not possible to apply the tolling statute88 because the
cause of action was barred prior to the time of the minor's injuries.
The importance of tolling in relation to statutes of limitations is espe-
cially pertinent in the area of establishing paternity. Infants cannot act on
their own, and if Texas's one-year paternity time limitation" is sustained
against the infant, the true party in interest, a fundamental right will be
denied to that infant before it can even talk. Some hope that so harsh a
rule may not be sustained was raised in Texas Department of Human Re-
sources v. Delley,9° which held that the general four-year statute of limita-
tions9' was applicable to suits brought in behalf of children born prior to
the effective date of the Family Code's statute of limitations. The court
went on to hold that the general statute was tolled92 during the infant's
minority, and since this child was born in 1968, the suit was timely. 93 In
support of its decision the court discussed the importance of having par-
ents support their children rather than placing the burden on the taxpay-
ers.94 The court further stated that the right for the child is too
fundamental to permit its forfeiture by the inaction of others.95
The importance of legitimacy as a basis for obtaining child support is
recognized by the courts. When a divorced father attempts to avoid pay-
ing court ordered child support by later denying paternity, the courts will
invoke the doctrine of res judicata and deny him relief.96 Courts will find
children legitimate on the basis of judicial admissions in pleadings97 and
will not allow the blood test statutes 98 to be used to establish nonpaternity
when a child has been conceived during the period of the marriage al-
though born after the divorce. 99 In such a situation the court held that
only the traditional defenses such as nonaccess or impotence apply. When,
on the other hand, it is possible to prove nonaccess by a first husband, then
a second husband may be found to be the father of a child born during the
earlier marriage." A child born prior to marriage may be legitimated by
the father's marrying the mother, signing the birth certificate, and estab-
lishing proof of access.'°'
87. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon Supp. 1980).
88. Id. art. 5535 (Vernon 1958).
89. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
90. 581 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
91. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
92. Id. art. 5535.
93. See also Levescy v. Crocker, 585 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no
writ).
94. 581 S.W.2d at 522.
95. Id.
96. Thompson v. Thompson, 572 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
97. Johnson v. Johnson, 579 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
98. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
99. Magana v. Magana, 576 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ).
100. Blacksher v. Blacksher, 575 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
101. Middaugh v. Merritt, 576 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ);
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Although the doctrine of adoption by estoppel has long been recognized
by Texas courts,"°2 such children are not necessarily of the same status as
are legally adopted children. The court in Amos v. Central Freight Lines10 3
held that the claimants could not bring a wrongful death action' 4 since
they were neither naturally born nor legally adopted children of the dece-
dent. The court held that this is the definition of children required by the
statute. Therefore, despite the fact that there was a pending adoption pro-
ceeding at the time of the death of the decedent, these children, although
probably adopted by estoppel, are not covered by the statute.
IV. CONSERVATORSHIP
A trial court's findings as to conservatorship are usually sustained,10 5
but if a jury finding is supported by the evidence, then a judgment non
obstante veredicto will be reversed. 10 6 Since temporary conservatorship
orders are not appealable,0 7 frustrated parties may try self-help, and
courts may attempt coercion through contempt, but contempt will not lie
unless there has been compliance with due process.'0 8 Courts should be
cautious about entering default judgments in matters concerning custody.
In Buckler v. Tate °9 the mother obtained a hearing by means of an equita-
ble bill of review. She was able to have a child custody decree in a default
divorce set aside on a showing that she had a meritorious defense, that her
failure to file an answer was not intentional, and that no injury would
result to the opposite party.l"°
In personam jurisdiction is required for the settlement of conservator-
ship questions, but it is not required in order to give a court subject matter
jurisdiction when the children are physically before the court."I  Thus,
Texas courts can decide custody matters when only one party and the chil-
dren are present although another state may not have to give full faith and
cf. Raulston v. Raulston, 531 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ) (fa-
ther's voluntary statement of paternity held not sufficient to overcome proof of nonpater-
nity).
102. Cavanaugh v. Davis, 149 Tex. 573, 235 S.W.2d 972 (1951).
103. 575 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1978, no writ).
104. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1952).
105. See Graham v. Graham, 584 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ)
(supporting trial court's finding that best interest of children served by dividing custody of
two children); Gaspard v. Gaspard, 582 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no
writ) (jury finding that mother should have custody; appellate court sustained without com-
ment); Swearingen v. Swearingen, 578 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1979, writ dism'd) (while appeal was pending, father found in contempt for failure to pay
child support; his application for writ of habeas corpus denied in Exparte Swearingen, 574
S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ)).
106. Kelley v. Kelley, 583 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ dism'd).
107. Craft v. Craft, 580 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 1979).
108. Expare Mouille, 572 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no
writ).
109. 572 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
110. Id. at 564-65.
Ill. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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credit to the decree. 1 2 When, however, the suit for divorce and custody is
filed prior to the time when one of the parties leaves the state, the court
should resolve the entire question of conservatorship since it has had juris-
diction from the beginning."
13
Modification of divorce decrees by trial courts are given as much defer-
ence by appellate courts as are the original orders,' 14 even as to the award-
ing of attorneys' fees." 5 Modifications must be based on a material
change of circumstances of the original managing conservator and on a
showing that appointment of a new managing conservator will be a posi-
tive improvement for the child; failure to so find is ground for reversal.' 
16
In personam jurisdiction is as important for modification of a decree
relating to conservatorship as it is for the initial decree. In Miller v.
Miller" 7 a mother who resided with her two children in Arizona success-
fully contested the jurisdiction of the Texas courts on the basis that she was
an Arizona resident. No evidence was heard in the case, but at the time of
the divorce decree in 1977 she was an Arizona resident, and, since she was
served with notice of the modification hearing in Arizona in 1978, there
was nothing to controvert the presumption that she had remained an Ari-
zona resident. The father contended that the Texas long-arm statute" 8
applied, but the court, relying on Corliss v. Smilh," 9 held that since the
mother had resided in a foreign jurisdiction for more than six months, it
would be presumed that Texas courts are no longer a proper forum for the
adjudication of these parent-child relationship claims. When, however,
the parent and child contesting personal jurisdiction of the Texas courts
have been absent from the state for only a short time prior to the filing of a
motion to modify conservatorship, Texas courts should hear the case. This
was the reasoning of the appellate court in reversing the trial court's dis-
missal of such a motion in Oubre v. Oubre.'2  The appellate court found
that all the witnesses who could testify concerning the child were in Texas,
and thus there would be no denial of due process to the mother in requir-
ing her to appear in Texas.
12
'
112. Thornlow v. Thornlow, 576 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no
writ).
113. Pollock v. Dowell, 583 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
114. See Gehring v. Gehring, 582 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no
writ); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 582 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ);
Bagley v. Scott, 582 S.W.2d 511, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Colbert v.
Stokes, 581 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ); In re B-S-L-,
579 S.W.2d 527, 528-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
115. Reyna v. Reyna, 584 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no
writ).
116. See Sutter v. Hendricks, 575 S.W.2d 308, 309-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ
refd n.r.e.); D.W.D. v. R.D.P., 571 S.W.2d 224, 225-26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978,
writ ref d n.r.e.).
117. 575 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ). But see Webb v. Webb,
582 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
118. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
119. 560 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
120. 575 S.W.2d 363, 364-65 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
121. Id. at 365.
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When children have been in Texas more than six months, and all parties
are present, Texas courts should take jurisdiction despite a valid out-of-
state custody decree. This was the decision of the appeals court in Rankin
P. Gray,'22 in which the appellate court overturned the trial court's grant-
ing of a writ of habeas corpus to the out-of-state father. The couple had
been divorced in New Hampshire in 1978, and the mother was awarded
custody of the children. She subsequently remarried, moved to Texas, and
refused to send the children back to New Hampshire to visit their father,
although she invited him to come to Texas. The father went into a New
Hampshire court and obtained modification of the original decree to give
him the right to custody; the mother neither answered nor appeared. The
father than came to Texas to obtain a writ of habeas corpus for the return
of the children, which the trial court granted based on the Texas Family
Code habeas corpus statute. 23 The appellate court pointed out that this
was an erroneous interpretation of the statute, since an exception to an
immediate granting of a writ of habeas corpus arises whenever the chil-
dren are found to have been out of the relator's, in this case the father's,
possession for at least six months preceding the filing of the application for
the writ.' 24 The children in Rankin had been in Texas for over a year.
The trial court should have denied the writ and granted a hearing on the
mother's cross-action for custody. 125
When a court has acquired jurisdiction over all parties, including the
out-of-state resident, it cannot be taken away by the subsequent filing of a
petition in a foreign court. The Texas court has the power to protect its
jurisdiction by enjoining the prosecution of the out-of-state suit. This ac-
tion was taken by the trial court in Mayo v. Hall,126 which refused to allow
the father to take the children out of Texas for visitation until his custody
action in California had been dismissed with prejudice.
The courts have been rather strict in interpreting the language of various
portions of the Family Code and have held that the Code will not permit
the relitigation of custody within a year of the decree. 127 There is, how-
ever, disagreement as to who has standing to attack a custody decree. In
Watts v. Watts' 28 the Fort Worth court of civil appeals held that a grand-
father was a "party affected" and had standing, despite the fact that he had
not been a party in the original suit for divorce. In the original suit the
mother had been named managing conservator. The court interpreted the
section of the Code pertaining to modification as meaning that a "party
affected" was the same as a "person affected" and decided that grandpar-
122. 584 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
124. 584 S.W.2d at 542 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(b)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1980)).
125. 584 S.W.2d at 541.
126. 571 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Supp. 1980); see Figueroa v. Figueroa, 580
S.W.2d 621, 622-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ) (petition for modification based
solely on change of physical custody should be dismissed).
128. 573 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ).
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ents are in that category.' 29 The court pointed out that even if the modifi-
cation section was not found to be applicable, the general section
pertaining to suits for the appointment of managing conservators would
entitle the grandfather to standing, since that section uses the word "per-
son" rather than "party."'1
30
The problem of which county has jurisdiction to hear a habeas corpus
petition continues to trouble the courts. The Texas Supreme Court in
Trader v. Dear'3 ' held that such jurisdiction is not limited to the court
with continuing jurisdiction but may also extend to the court in the county
where the child is found. An appellate court in Alvarado v. Alvarado'32
held as a logical extension of this rule that such a suit may also be brought
in the county where the relator resides, even though the child is not in that
county. The court observed that this rule should help prevent child-
snatching, because if the relator is the person with rightful custody, he can
remain in the county of his residence, and the wrongful possessor would
have to bring the child back to that county.' 33 Another court of civil ap-
peals pointed out that courts of civil appeals have very limited habeas
corpus jurisdiction and can only issue a writ where there has been confine-
ment based upon a violation of a court order in a divorce, child support, or
child custody case.' 34 It then dismisssed a petition that was based not on a
violation of an order but on the effect of an allegedly void order.'35 If the
time for appeal had passed, the mother should have proceeded either by a
bill of review or a motion to modify.
Visitation, or possessory conservatorship, can cause as many problems
as custody or managing conservatorship. Courts can be called upon to
interpret the visitation terms of a divorce decree,' 36 or there may be an
unsuccessful attempt to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction to prevent en-
forcement of a decree.' 37 Parents should not agree to the entry of orders
depriving them of access in exchange for relieving them of the duty of
support, since the basis for a change in that order is a material change of
circumstances on the part of the children, not on the part of the person
129. "A court order or the portion of a decree that provides for... the appointment of a
conservator ... may be modified only ... in the court having jurisdiction of the suit affect-
ing the parent-child relationship. Anyparty affected by the order or the portion of the decree
to be modified may file the motion." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980)
(emphasis added).
130. "A suit affecting the parent-child relationship may be brought by anyperson with an
interest in the child .. " TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03 (Vernon 1975) (emphasis added).
But see Barrientos v. Garza, 559 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). See
also Solender, supra note 14, at 167.
131. 565 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. 1978).
132. 583 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
133. Id. at 912-13.
134. Exparte Sarao, 583 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
135. Id. at 439.
136. Strunck v. Peoples, 576 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
137. Dirr v. Chancery Court, 585 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming dismissal based
on lack of jurisdiction, since Texas district court lacked power to serve process in Missis-
sippi).
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seeking the change. In Files v. Thomasson 3 the father agreed to such an
order. Later, when he decided that he did want access to his children, the
court held that his remarriage, the fact that his new wife was pregnant, and
that he "subjectively wanted to see them" was not such a material or sub-




Most support orders are based on the agreement of the parties or are
entered after the facts have been fully litigated; few appeals come from the
original decree. Nevertheless, when an order in the guise of a consent
judgment is entered that changes the provisions of the underlying written
agreement without notice to one of the parties affected, some remedy
should be afforded that party. In Mikeska v. Mikeska 4 ° an agreement to
pay only the amount of child support the father saw fit was changed in the
decree to require him to pay child support of $400 per month. The new
language was incorporated into the original decree. The appellate court
found that the decree as modified was vague and ambiguous and ordered
the trial court to clarify the conflict. '4 ' The dissent argued that the original
agreement was against public policy and that the trial court had attempted
to effect an amicable settlement while at the same time looking after the
best interests of the child. 142 In two cases in which the mothers were found
to have little, if any, earning capacity the trial courts were held not to have
abused their discretion by awarding rather high child support payments. 1
43
No abuse in discretion was found in the refusal by the trial judge to order
the mother of a handicapped child to contribute to his support after the
child's eighteenth birthday.' 44 The court based its decision on the statute
providing that support of a handicapped child after eighteen may be or-
dered and, therefore, the order is discretionary.
145
Enforcement of child support orders continues to be a problem. The
statute provides that such orders may be enforced by contempt proceed-
ings or that arrearages may be reduced to judgment and enforced as any
other judgment for debt. 146 When a party is found in contempt and or-
dered confined, the remedy for the incarcerated party is a writ of habeas
corpus. 147 Such writs will be granted if the orders on which the contempt
138. 578 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1979, no writ).
139. 578 S.W.2d at 884-85.
140. 584 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
141. Id. at 566.
142. Id. at 567.
143. Paugh v. Paugh, 579 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ) ($500 per
month for three-month-old boy); Maben v. Maben, 574 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, no writ) ($600 per month for 15-year-old girl).
144. Valaque v. Valaque, 574 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
145. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(b) (Vernon 1975).
146. Id. § 14.09.
147. Anderson v. Burleson, 583 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979,
no writ).
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is based are conditional, 4 8 unclear,149 or were not in writing at the time of
the issuance of the order. ' 0 Additional grounds for dismissal include mat-
ters for which contempt will not lie, such as an ordinary debt, 5 ' and tech-
nicalities, such as the miswriting of a date.'5 2 A court of civil appeals will
not grant the writ if the Texas Supreme Court has already refused to grant
it, even though the lower court has no knowledge of the reason for de-
nial. 1 3 In a situation where the contemnor had been called as an adverse
witness, appeared without counsel, and testified without objection, the ap-
pellate court construed the proceedings as requiring the contemnor to tes-
tify against himself in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
and found that he had to be released. t54 A coercive contempt order was
found to be void and the contemnor ordered released after he had made
the support payments.'55 Continuing his confinement could not enforce
compliance with payment on the specified date since that date had already
passed. In another case it was found to be double jeopardy to continue to
confine the husband after he had made all ordered payments, because he
had also violated a portion of the divorce decree that enjoined him from
having any unreasonable physical contact with his wife. 156 He had, it ap-
pears, run his wife off the highway, broken into her home, and physically
abused her. For these activities he had been tried, found guilty, fined, and
spent thirty days in jail. Although he did violate the court order, he had
already been criminally prosecuted for the same activities, and to order
him confined for additional time for the same offense is unconstitu-
tional. 157
Exparte Chandler.. is a troublesome opinion and one that this author
hopes will not be followed by other courts. A Dallas court entered a de-
cree of divorce in 1975 ordering, among other things, that relator Chandler
pay child support. In 1977 Chandler filed a motion to modify, and in 1978,
pursuant to a motion by the respondent and in accordance with the Texas
Family Code,'5 9 the Dallas court ordered the proceedings transferred to
Harris County. Several months later the respondent filed a motion in the
Harris County court, alleging that Chandler was in arrears in child support
payments. Chandler filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the
Dallas court was the only court with continuing jurisdiction with respect to
148. Exparle Mason, 584 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
149. In re Miller, 584 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); Exparte
Turner, 584 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ); Exparte
McConnell, 580 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
150. Exparte Pruske, 575 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
151. In re Roberts, 584 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
152. Exparte Hemmitt, 580 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no
writ).
153. Exparle Dillard, 577 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
154. Exparte Harris, 581 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
155. Exparte Grothe, 581 S.W.2d 296, 296-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ).
156. Exparte Brown, 574 S.W.2d 618, 620-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
157. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 14.
158. 580 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, no writ).
159. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
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the alleged contempt. The appeals court decided that despite the plain
language of the statute, 60 the actions of Chandler prior to transfer could
not be subject to contempt by the transferee court, destroying the entire
concept of the statute regarding transfers.' 6 ' The purpose of having one
court of continuing jurisdiction is to provide for the orderly disposition of
all matters relating to the children of a particular family. The purpose of
the transfer provisions is to enable, in our mobile society, a single court to
supervise the matters concerning the children and at the same time make
the supervision convenient from the standpoint of both the court and the
parties involved. This decision, if widely followed, would destroy that
unity and make it necessary either to go back to the original court after
transfer to enforce the child support arrearage by contempt, or to obtain a
judgment against the nonpaying spouse prior to the transfer so that it
could be transported as could any other judgment. 62
Courts during the past survey year appeared to be reluctant to deny any
applications for writs of habeas corpus in child support cases. If the order
is clear enough, however, and the relator cannot show proof of indigency,
then the writ will be denied. 163 Lack of certainty, on the other hand, has
been found in a case in which the decree ordered the relator to pay for
future medical expenses for the children.' 64 The court in that case pointed
out that such a provision raised more questions than it answered.' 65 The
court wondered, as an example, if "medical expenses" includes dental and
orthodontic services.' 6 6 When a court in response to a motion for con-
tempt merely directs the husband to pay the arrearages in installments, the
direction is not appealable; it is not a final judgment because the contempt
motion was not disposed of.167
Contempt orders issued for violations of support orders that are based
on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA)168
should be brought in the Texas court that originally issued the order. The
court in In re Miller169 held that URESA suits are subject to the same
requirements of continuing jurisdiction as other suits affecting the parent-
child relationship and ordered the relator discharged because the second
court's order was void for lack of jurisdiction. In another URESA action
160. "A court to which a transfer is made becomes the court of continuing jurisdiction,
and all proceedings in the suit are continued as if it were brought there originally." TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(h) (Vernon 1975).
161. 580 S.W.2d at 13-14.
162. The appeals court based its holding on a 1922 supreme court decision that construed
an entirely different statute. See Exparte Gonzalez, 111 Tex. 399, 238 S.W. 635 (1922).
163. Exparle Roberts, 582 S.W.2d 910, 911-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
164. Exparte Shelton, 582 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Richey v. Bolerjack, 581 S.W.2d 780, 782-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979), rev'dand
remanded, 589 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. 1979), holding that absent the specific reservation of an
issue the judgment is final.
168. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ch. 21 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
169. 583 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
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the out-of-state wife filed suit to enforce her Georgia support order. 70
Her husband, who resided in Texas, answered and filed a counterclaim
asking that the payments be reduced. The wife had properly applied to the
Texas court, requesting that her Georgia decree be registered and con-
firmed. The trial court went behind the decree and agreed to the hus-
band's request for reduction. The appeals court held that to permit such
an action would "defeat URESA's goal of providing a simple and efficient
proceeding for enforcing foreign support orders."'
7
'
Obtaining a judgment for the amount in arrears is an alternative method
for enforcing child support. Sometimes a decree that might not be certain
enough to support a contempt motion may be reduced to judgment by the
use of parol evidence to explain the meaning of the original decree. This
was the situation in Johnson v. Johnson, 71 when after two of three chil-
dren reached the age of eighteen, the husband unilaterally reduced his
child support payments. The former wife then filed an action for delin-
quent support payments. There was a provision for the reduction of pay-
ments after the first child became eighteen, but the decree was silent as to
what would happen when the second child became eighteen. The appeals
court agreed with the trial court that it was reasonable to interpret the
decree as intending no reduction.7' The statute of limitations for the en-
forcement of judgments is ten years.174 A suit for back child support pay-
ments is timely, therefore, even, as here, afteir eight years.
The fact that there is some, but not sufficient, evidence of an agreement
by the former wife to accept a reduction in payments will not serve as an
estoppel so as to permit the doctrine of laches to apply. 75 After a former
husband dies it is no longer possible to obtain a judgment against him, and
since child support is not considered a debt, his estate may not be obligated
to continue payments. 176 By the same token, a suit against an executor of
an estate is not a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, so that the
original divorce court no longer has continuing jurisdiction., 77
A former wife and an adult son sued to enforce an agreement whereby
the former husband had committed himself to pay for his children's col-
170. O'Halloran v. O'Halloran, 580 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. Cir. App.-Texarkana 1979,
no writ).
171. Id. at 873.
172. 572 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
173. Id. at 366.
174. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958).
175. Cunniff v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ
dism'd); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ).
176. Martin v. Adair, 582 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ granted);
see Smith v. Branhall, 563 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978). The problem posed by this case is
caused by the fact that child support is not a debt, but rather an obligation, and so is en-
forceable by contempt as well as the usual debt remedies. Back child support is, moreover,
based on a court decree and so is different from the usual debt; therefore, it is perhaps a type
of judgment that should be enforceable against an estate. The Family Code, however, pro-
vides as follows: "Unless otherwise agreed to in writing or expressly provided in the decree,
provisions for the support of a child are terminated by ... the death of the parent obligated
to support the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(d) (Vernon 1975).
177. Carson v. Korus, 575 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ).
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lege education; if he failed to do so, he would have to pay reasonable legal
fees for the enforcement of that commitment. The court found that the
wife had a justiciable interest as the promisee of a third-party beneficiary
contract and had a right to collect attorney's fees, since the victory was for
her as well as for her son. 17
8
Summary judgment has been held permissible when the defendant files
his answer on the day of the hearing rather than seven days prior to the
hearing as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 179 In the same
case the ex-husband attempted to raise the claim that the attorney's fees
for the divorce of the ex-wife had been discharged in bankruptcy. The
appellate court denied that contention, as well as ruling that it was proper
for the trial court to add on post-judgment interest in accordance with Col-
orado law.' 8
0
If a former spouse is entitled to military retirement benefits, these bene-
fits may be attached for purposes of payment of child support judg-
ments."8' Retirement benefits are not current wages, and the fact that the
benefits are subject to garnishment has been settled law in Texas for more
than a year.'8 2
Failure to pay child support is a form of self-help that the managing
conservator spouse can overcome by court action. The only escape from
the obligation appears to be by hiding or perhaps by death, and even that
is not certain. 183 A suit to modify in the court of continuing jurisdiction is
the one lawful method for obtaining relief from excessive child support
payments.' 8 4 If, however, the amount of child support is based on a con-
tractual as well as a court ordered obligation, it is not clear whether or not
the court may abrogate the contract. 8 5 The court cannot enforce the con-
tractual support obligation by contempt, but that obligation might con-
tinue to be enforceable through the judgment process as would any other
contractual obligation. The court can, of course, enforce its modified or-
ders by contempt. In the Interest ofJM & G.M 186 is another case that
avoids directly answering the question of how to deal with a contractual
child support obligation while permitting a drastic downward modifica-
tion. The basis of the modification was that payments were to be escalated
solely in relation to an automatic formula and not in relation to the actual
178. Stegall v. Stegall, 571 S.W.2d 564, 565-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, no
writ).
179. Silcott v. Wilson, 579 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ) (noting
TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c)).
180. 579 S.W.2d at 293-94.
181. See Wager v. United States, 582 S.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1979, no writ); United States v. Miranda, 581 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1979, no writ); United States v. Wakefield, 572 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, writ dism'd).
182. See Solender, supra note 14, at 173.
183. See note 176 supra.
184. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
185. See e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 535 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no
writ).
186. 585 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
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circumstances of the parties. If the circumstances of both parties have
changed, the courts may order an upward modification of support pay-
ments, taking into account not only the needs of the children but also the
spouse's ability to pay.' 87 Macyeal v. MacAyea1'88 concerned a down-
ward modification that was based solely on the changed circumstances of
the payee-father. He became seriously ill immediately after the divorce
and was forced to limit his law practice to part-time, resulting in a sharp
drop in income. While the trial court permitted some reduction in his sup-
port payments, the appellate court ordered a further reduction. It pointed
out that while the mother's living expenses exceeded her income, the father
"must be permitted to retain enough of his earnings to pay the necessary
expense of living and earning a living."'
' 89
The mother of twins was able to obtain a slight upward modification of
the support order and relief from an improper entry of a decree in one
action.'9 The original support order had been for "$25 per week" instead
of "$25 per child per week" as had been shown on the docket sheet. The
mother was also able to show that her costs for such items as utilities, med-
ical insurance, and groceries had increased since 1975, the year of the di-
vorce, so the trial court's order to increase support to $27.50 per week per
child was affirmed.
VI. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
In addition to the problems of support and custody at the time of di-
vorce, there is also the possibility that a parent may lose all rights to his or
her child because of a suit to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re
HD.O. '9' was a suit to terminate the parent-child relationship and to
name a paternal aunt the managing conservator; the suit was heard on the
same day as the divorce between the natural parents. The court granted
the divorce, denied the termination, but made the aunt managing conser-
vator. The mother appealed, claiming that the "best interest of the child
standard" of the Texas Family Code 92 was unconstitutional in that it de-
nied "her 'fundamental right to family integrity.' "193 The appellate court
found specifically that the "best interest of the child standard" is constitu-
tional and sustained the trial court. In another case the parent-child rela-
tionship proceeding occurred some years after the divorce and was
successfully brought by the mother against the father.' 94 This was a situa-
tion involving divergent life-styles, and the court found that the father had
not been able to sustain the presumption that the best interest of the child
187. Poynter v. Haik, 580 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ); Hazelwood
v. Jinkins, 580 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, no writ).
188. 575 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
189. Id. at 627.
190. Moon v. Moon, 573 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
191. 580 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
192. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
193. 580 S.W.2d at 423.
194. McGuire v. Brown, 580 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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would be served by the continuation of the parent-child relationship.' 95
The court also found that despite the fact that there had been no specific
order in the divorce decree on the subject of child support, the father had
failed to support the child in accordance with his ability and, therefore,
termination was justified. 196
An application for a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus was granted to a
natural mother who claimed that she was being denied access to her
child.' 97 The respondents, after producing the child as ordered, filed a
plea of privilege to be sued in their own county, which was denied.' 98 In
another case suit was brought to terminate parental rights against a
mother, probable father, and maternal grandmother.' 99 The mother re-
sponded with a plea of privilege to be sued in her home county, the trial
court sustained the plea, and plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court
pointed out that while the pleading should not have been denoted a plea of
privilege but rather a motion to transfer and was therefore not appealable,
the appellants were not harmed by the change in terminology since they
had relied on the venue rules of the Family Code and so were not mis-
led.200
Crahan v. N.R.2 ° ' started out as a habeas corpus proceeding, but was
found by the appellate court to be a "simple suit for custody of a child."
Whatever the name of the proceeding, there was a hearing as to who had a
legal right to the child. It appeared that neither party had a legal right, so
the court utilized the best interest of the child standard20 2 and sustained
custody in the parties in possession. The case demonstrates the problems
that can arise when parties, in attempting to adopt a child, do not follow
proper legal procedures. In this instance the natural mother delivered the
child in an Ohio hospital under the name of the potential adoptive mother
and gave the name of the potential adoptive father as her husband. These
potential adoptive parents took the child at three days, shortly thereafter
moved to Texas, and filed a petition in a Texas court to adopt the child.
195. The record indicates that in this situation the mother had returned home with her
child and had returned to her original middle class values, while her former husband contin-
ued in his artistic ways. In fact, he expressed concern that his child would, by living in his
former wife's home, "develop materialistic points of view." 580 S.W.2d at 429. It was this
clash of values that ultimately led the court to conclude that termination of parental rights
was in the best interest of the child, since being subjected to two such different life-styles
could be damaging to the child.
196. The court relied on the case of Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1976), for its
interpretation of TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
197. Garza v. Shilling, 576 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
198. Id. at 151 (interpreting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980)).
The court by its interpretation of this section returned the writ of habeas corpus to the status
of the Great Writ, establishing precedent for its later holding in Alvarado v. Alvarado, 583
S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ). See note 132 supra and accom-
panying text.
199. Beyer v. Diaz, 585 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
200. Id. at 360-61.
201. 581 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ dism'd).
202. This standard was again attacked as unconstitutional, but the court saw no justifica-
tion for such a finding. Id. at 275.
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The attorney ad litem who had been appointed to represent the unknown
parents found and notified the natural mother, and she answered in the
adoption suit. The adoption suit had been abated pending determination
of the custody suit appeal; presumably now the court in the adoption suit
can obtain a full development of the facts and decide whether the parent-
child relationship of the natural mother should be terminated in order to
grant the adoption. There was some discussion of Ohio law, but since all
the parties were in Texas and all the problems were Texas problems, the
court held Ohio law to be irrelevant. 20 3
The right of strangers to petition for the adoption of a child who is
under the managing conservatorship of an adoption agency was sustained
in two cases.2° The courts interpreted the Family Code to mean that any-
one can file a petition to adopt,20 5 and, while the managing conservator
may withhold consent, this may be done only for good cause.20 6 The bur-
den of proving lack of good cause, however, has been held to be on the
persons requesting consent. Good cause on the part of the managing con-
servator is presumed.20 7 In both cases the fact that petitioners were alleg-
edly related to the child in question was not considered relevant, since the
parent-child relationship, and thus all natural relationships, had been ter-
minated prior to the petition for adoption.
Barrow v. Durham208 is an unfortunate case that illustrates the need for
courts to delay the termination of the parent-child relationship until it is
clear that the family unit cannot remain intact. The case involved a
Vietnamese mother who came to the United States with her American-
born husband and their children. She was unable to speak any English
and when, because of marital difficulties, her husband took their children
and abandoned them at a Catholic children's center in Corpus Christi, she
had great difficulty in comprehending what had happened to them. Ulti-
mately she became dependent upon welfare, and the children were tempo-
rarily placed in the custody of the Nueces County Child Welfare Unit.
The parent-child relationship of both the mother and her husband was
terminated, but the court ordered the Child Welfare Unit to work with the
mother to allow her an opportunity to provide a home for the children.
This order included a six-month restriction as to placement for adop-
tion. 209 Eventually, the six older children were legally restored to the
203. Id.
204. Goetz v. Lutheran Social Serv. of Texas, Inc., 579 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1979, no writ); In the Interest of Unnamed Child, 584 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1979, writ filed).
205. 584 S.W.2d at 478; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980) ("Any
adult is eligible to adopt a child who may be adopted.").
206. 584 S.W.2d at 478; 579 S.W.2d at 84; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.05(d) (Vernon
1975).
207. See Chapman v. Edna Gladney Home, 561 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, no writ).
208. 574 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ granted).
209. This order is anomalous because a decree of termination of parental rights severs
the parent-child relationship for all matters. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon Supp.
1980).
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mother, and throughout this period the mother was reassured about the
two youngest children and the possibility for their restoration. During the
hearings on termination and restoration all of the children had been repre-
sented by the same guardian ad litem, and the case had been conducted
under the same docket number. The youngest children had been placed
from the beginning in the home of the appellees, and without notice to the
mother or the attorney ad litem they had obtained a judgment for the
adoption of the children. The attorney ad litem and the mother brought a
bill of review to overturn the adoption. The trial court dismissed on the
basis that since the mother and the attorney ad litem had not been parties
to the adoption proceeding, they had no standing to contest the adoption.
The appellate court sustained a bill of review, holding that while adoption
and termination of parental rights proceedings are separate and distinct, so
that an attorney ad litem for one proceeding is not a party in the other
proceeding, still the mother or attorney ad litem could act as next friend to
the minor children and would have standing to bring a bill of review.21°
The reasoning is strained, but the appellate court appears to have tried to
do equity, at least for the mother. All these hearings and the attendant
grief for both the natural mother and the purported adoptive parents could
have been avoided if the court had not so hastily terminated the parent-
child relationship. The termination of the parent-child relationship should
be final, and if there appears to be a need for further consideration of the
relationship, there should be no termination."' A child welfare unit can
always be granted permanent managing conservatorship of the children,
thus protecting the children while at the same time preventing a decree for
adoption without notice to the natural parents because of the requirement
of a hearing on the question of termination.21 2
The Sims213 case cast its shadow over a number of child welfare cases.
In one case2  a federal court, following the Younger 2I" doctrine, abstained
from interfering in the pending state proceeding, but did enjoin the state
from entering into its Child Abuse and Neglect Report and Inquiry System
(CANRIS) 216 any report identifying the plaintiffs as child abusers until
there had been a final judicial determination on the merits. In two other
cases2 17 a state appeals court specifically found contrary to the holding in
210. 574 S.W.2d at 860.
211. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jefferson County Child Welfare Unit, 557 S.W.2d 569, 571
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ); Baggett v. State, 541 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
212. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.09(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
213. Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'dand
dismissed sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 99 S. Ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979); see notes 14-15
supra and accompanying text.
214. Brown v. Jones, 473 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
215. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), held that federal courts should refrain from
interfering in state court proceedings concerning state statutes when there is an adequate
forum in the state courts for disposing of constitutional questions.
216. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.06 (Vernon 1975).
217. In the Interest of G.M., 580 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ
granted); Woodward v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 573 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Sims and held that the proper evidence standard is preponderance of the
evidence. The court stated that prior rulings of the Texas Supreme Court
require this standard."1 8 It should be pointed out that the appeals court
did not rely on precedent for termination of the parental-child relation-
ship.
In three cases the trial court's termination of the parent-child relation-
ship was sustained21 9 on the statutory grounds that the parents had "know-
ingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child"22 despite the
fact that in one case 22' the mother was of low mental ability. In Com-
pasano v. State222 the mother was able to obtain a reversal of the judgment
terminating her parental rights because the state had not been able to
prove that she had not supported the child in accordance with her ability
for a full year. During part of the period of alleged nonsupport the mother
had been unemployed and dependent on friends for her support.
Shapley v. Texas Department of Human Resources223 reversed the termi-
nation of the mother's parent-child relationship but sustained the father's
termination. This was a widely publicized case of child abuse, and the
mother was the person who brought the matter to the attention of the au-
thorities. The trial judge expressed inflammatory opinions to the media
concerning the case, but his apparent bias was not a sufficient basis to ob-
tain a reversal as to the father. It may be that had proper procedures been
followed there could have been a reversal on the grounds that the judge
should have followed the statutory procedures on motions for recusal.
224
The stated ground for reversal of the mother's termination was insufficient
evidence in the face of recommendations by both the county attorney and
the guardian ad litem against the termination of the mother's parental
rights.225
218. 580 S.W.2d at 69; 573 S.W.2d at 598-99. But see Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349
(Tex. 1976).
219. B-J-M- v. Moore, 582 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); Gon-
zalez v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Sanchez v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 581 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
220. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
221. B-J-M- v. Moore, 582 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
222. 576 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ).
223. 581 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ).
224. "A district judge shall request the Presiding Judge to assign a judge of the Adminis-
trative District to hear any motions to recuse such district judge from a case pending in his
court." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
225. 581 S.W.2d at 254.
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